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I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant is the Idaho Transportation Department. Appellant may hereafter be referred 
to as "ITD" or "the Department". Respondent is Ascorp, Inc. d/b/a Debco Construction. 
Respondent may hereafter be referred to as "Debco". The Parties are engaged in a dispute 
related to amounts rightfully due and owing under a highway construction contract. Debco filed 
a formal claim on October 28, 2013 to seek recovery of additional amounts claimed due. Such 
filing was in accord with ITD's administrative claim review process that is contained in the 
Department's Standard Specifications for Highway Construction. However, on the very next 
day, October 29, 2013, Debco submitted an arbitration demand in direct contravention of the 
administrative claim appeal process. Respondent's actions to initiate premature arbitration 
severely impaired ITD's ability to do a thorough claim analysis so as to mitigate or perhaps 
completely resolve the contract claim. 
To protect the administrative claims process, the Department brought suit in district court 
to seek declaratory and injunctive relief related to the timing of arbitration vis-a-vis the claim 
procedures. This is an appeal from (i) a Civil Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal that was granted by 
District Court Judge Steven J. Hippler, and (ii) an award of attorneys' fees and costs made 
subsequent to said dismissal. The Department asserts that both decisions were erroneous and it 
requests that this Court correct such mistakes. 
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B. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Respondent Debco filed its claim for additional contract monies with the Department on 
October 28, 2013. (R. 000048 - 000050). 
One day later, on October 29, 2013, Debco filed an arbitration demand with the 
American Arbitration Association ("AAA"). (R. 000052 - 000107). 
So as to avoid any waiver per the AAA Construction Arbitration Rules, ITD was forced 
to respond to the arbitration demand on November 21, 2013, and to also file a motion to stay 
arbitration pending the contractually-required exhaustion of ITD's administrative claim review 
process. (R. 000109 - 000129). 
Debco opposed the Department's motion on November 22, 2013, and requested that 
AAA proceed with administration of the matter. (R. 000133). 
AAA (Michael Powell) emailed the parties' counsel on November 22, 2013, and stated 
that "Absent mutual agreement or court order, the Association shall proceed with the 
administration of the matter." (R. 000131; emphasis added). 
On December 2, 2013, Debco filed a motion with AAA to request that a briefing 
schedule be set and that an arbitration date be scheduled. (R. 000135 - 000138). 
In response to the actions of Debco and the suggestions of AAA, ITD filed a December 
10, 2013 Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief with the Fourth Judicial 
District Court in Ada County. (R. 000005 - 000138). 
On January 23, 2014, AAA scheduled a preliminary hearing for February 5, 2014, and 
requested initial payment from the parties by or before January 31, 2014. (R. 000319-000323). 
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Given the pending AAA hearing, ITD filed motions on January 27, 2014 for a Temporary 
Restraining Order ("TRO") (R. 000311 - 000312) and a preliminary injunction (R. 000313 -
000314) (the preliminary injunction was scheduled to be heard at a February 10, 2014 hearing). 
On January 28, 2014, Debco filed a TRO opposition and told the court that it had paid both 
parties' AAA fees. (R. 000353 - 000356). 
The district court declined ITD's requested TRO on January 30, 2014, concluding that 
Debco' s payment of AAA fees removed pending harm. This occurred via a telephonic 
conference and it is believed that no transcript or written order exists. 
AAA continued with its preliminary hearing on February 5, 2014. However, at that time, 
the panel declined to schedule a full arbitration hearing to consider the actual merits of Debco' s 
claim. Granted the requested time by AAA, ITD withdrew its February 10, 2014 motion for a 
preliminary injunction. (R. 000466 - 000467). 
On February 10, 2014, the district court-after being apprised of AAA's delay in 
arbitration scheduling-granted Debco' s request for a Civil Rule 12(b )( 6) dismissal (written 
order from the court was issued on February 21, 2014). (R. 000468 - 000469). 
Debco filed a Memorandum of Costs and Fees on February 21, 2014. (R. 000472 -
000483). Despite ITD's objection, the district court awarded fees and discretionary costs on 
May 12, 2014. (R. 000516- 000517). 
ITD timely appealed the district court's dismissal and the award of attorneys' fees and 
costs. (R. 000497 - 000500) and (R. 000524 - 000527). 
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C. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. Contract Structure, Claim Process And Dispute Resolution Provisions 
In May of 2010, Respondent submitted a proposal to Appellant ITD whereby Debco 
would reconstruct a portion of Washington Street in the City of Twin Falls, Idaho (hereafter 
"Washington Street project"). Said proposal by Debco was in the form of a unit price bid in the 
amount of $6,531,483.40. The pricing proposal can be found in the Amended Clerk's Record on 
Appeal filed on July 10, 2014, Exhibit A to ITD's initial Complaint (R. 000016 - 000028). The 
Washington Street project was to be a local road project administered by ITD. 
On or about June 3, 2010, ITD and Debco entered into a contract for the Washington 
Street project. The contract is identified as ITD Contract No. 7418. Lonnie E. Simpson signed 
the contract on behalf of Debco. The contract incorporated Debco's unit price bid in the amount 
of $6,531,483.40. Copies of contract pages CA-1 (entitled "CONTRACT AGREEMENT") and 
CA-2 (signature page) are included within the Complaint as Exhibit B. (R. 000030 - 000031). 
The contract also incorporates ITD's 2004 Standard Specifications for Highway Construction. 
The Standard Specifications booklet is a sizeable document which addresses numerous aspects of 
contracting and construction. 
Of relevance for ITD's Complaint and this appeal is Standard Specification 105.17. See 
Complaint at Exhibit C. (R. 000033 - 000040). As can be seen, the provision is titled "Claims 
for Adjustment and Disputes," and it contains the following subheadings: 
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROVISIONS (page 33); 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (page 33); 
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GENERAL (page 38); 
AUDITS (page 38); and 
BINDING ARBITRATION (page 40). 
Standard Specification 105.17 provides ITD with the opportunity to resolve claims via an 
administrative claims process prior to being subjected to a binding arbitration proceeding. Under 
this provision, the administrative claim process begins with an ITD Resident Engineer who has 
90 days after receipt of a documented claim to analyze and make a decision. See 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS entry on pages 33-37 of the Complaint's Exhibit C. (R. 000033 
- 000037). 
If a contractor is not satisfied, however, it may appeal a Resident Engineer's decision to 
ITD's Chief Engineer. See ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS entry at pages 37-38 (again at 
Exhibit C) (R. 000037 - 000038). This provision requires a decision from the Chief Engineer 
within 90 days after the Chief Engineer receives a documented claim appeal. Most claims are 
resolved at the Resident Engineer or Chief Engineer level. 
If a contractor remains unsatisfied, however, it can then demand arbitration: 
If the Contractor is to make a demand for arbitration, it must be 
made within 120 days of the date of the Chief Engineer's decision, 
otherwise the Chief Engineer's decision shall be final and 
conclusive. 
See Complaint at Exhibit C, BINDING ARBITRATION entry at page 40 (last paragraph). (R. 
000040). 
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Arbitration is only available, however, after completion of the preceding administrative 
claims process: 
The Contractor shall exhaust the Administrative Process for resolution, unless the 
Contractor and the Department agree that claims that have not been resolved 
through the Administrative Process provided in this section shall be resolved 
through binding arbitration. The Contractor and the Department may agree on an 
arbitration process, or, if the Contractor and the Department cannot agree, 
arbitration shall be administered through the American Arbitration Association 
(AAA) using the following arbitration methods: 
[References Expedited or Standard AAA provisions depending on the claim 
amount.] 
The Department and Contractor agree that any arbitration hearing shall be 
conducted in Boise, Idaho. 
The Contractor and the Department agree to be bound by the decision of the 
binding arbitration, and the judgment rendered by the arbitrator(s). The decision 
of the arbitrator(s) and the specific basis for the decision shall be in writing. The 
arbitrator(s) shall use the contract as a basis for the decision. 
Unless the Contractor and the Department agree, all unresolved claims and 
disputes which arise from the contract, must be brought in a single arbitration 
hearing. 
See BINDING ARBITRATION entry on page 40 (Exhibit C). (R. 000040). 
Separate from the administrative claims process, the Standard Specifications allow the 
Parties to retain a technical expert to make non-binding recommendations. Further, the contract 
allows the Parties to potentially avoid a formal claim via a Dispute Resolution Board. The 
Dispute Resolution Board is also specified as being a non-binding process. 
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2. Debco Filed An Arbitration Demand The Very Next Day After Submitting Its 
Claim 
During the Washington Street project and thereafter, Appellant ITD agreed to contract 
adjustments that increased the amount actually paid to Respondent Debco to approximately $8.4 
million. Prior to October 28, 2013, the Parties were engaged in non-binding efforts to address 
Debee's additional payment adjustment requests (over and above the approximately $1.9 million 
that had already been provided in excess of Debee's unit price bid). These efforts included both 
a technical expert recommendation and an initial hearing before a Dispute Resolution Board. In 
accordance with the contract, ITD participated in good faith, but never agreed that either effort 
was anything but non-binding. 
Debco submitted its initial claim to ITD on October 28, 2013. That document 
accompanies the Complaint as Exhibit E. (R. 000048 - 000050). This submission commenced 
the administrative claims review process. The very next day, October 29, 2013, Debco 
submitted a demand for arbitration to the American Arbitration Association (hereafter "AAA"). 
See Complaint at Exhibit F (this is a large document with multiple appendices and its own 
exhibits). (R. 000052 - 000107). The arbitration demand acknowledged that Debco had not 
exhausted the administrative claims process. ITD never agreed to any waiver of the 
administrative claims process. 
ITD's initial participation in the arbitration process was to object to arbitration timing and 
to avoid potential waiver. Such forced participation did not negate the need for the declaratory 
relief that was later requested from the district court. 
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3. ITD Needed To Stay The Arbitration Proceeding 
Appellant ITD objected to Respondent's arbitration demand because Debco failed to 
exhaust the administrative claims process, and because ITD was not given the opportunity to 
address and/or resolve claims prior to arbitration commencing. To avoid any waiver pursuant to 
the AAA arbitration rules, ITD formally made such objections to AAA. See Complaint at 
Exhibit G. (R. 000109 - 000129). Notwithstanding ITD's objection, AAA stated: "Absent 
mutual agreement or court order, the Association shall proceed with the administration of this 
matter." See AAA's November 22, 2013 e-mail attached to the Complaint as Exhibit H 
(emphasis added). (R. 000131). AAA proceeded with the empaneling of an arbitration panel, 
which meant that ITD was faced with initial upfront arbitration costs. 
Respondent Debco opposed ITD's request to hold arbitration in abeyance. See e-mail 
from Debco's attorney attached to the Complaint as Exhibit I. (R. 000133). Debco further 
submitted a motion to AAA asking that an arbitration hearing be promptly scheduled. See 
Debco's December 2, 2013 motion attached to the Complaint as Exhibit J. (R. 000135 -
000138). 
Because Debco failed to exhaust the administrative claims process prior to demanding 
arbitration, and because ITD was precluded from addressing and/or resolving formal claims prior 
to commencement of arbitration, ITD felt obligated to enforce the contract provisions pertaining 
to the administrative claims process. By so doing, ITD hoped to preclude inefficiency, avoid 
undue waste of public funds and resources, and prevent Debco from benefitting via certain 
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contract aspects that it liked (binding arbitration) while 1gnonng prov1s10ns that it found 
inconvenient (claims process). 
II. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the district court err in granting Respondent Debee's 12(b)(6) Motion to 
Dismiss? 
2. Is Appellant ITD, as a State of Idaho governmental entity, entitled to enforce its 
administrative claims process by seeking declaratory and/or injunctive relief from 
the courts? 
3. Did the district court err in awarding costs and fees to Respondent? 
III. 
ARGUMENT 
A. THIS COURT'S 2010 DECISION IN LAUGHY V. ITD PRECLUDED 
JURISDICTION IN A POST-CLAIMS FORUM UNLESS AND UNTIL 
THE PARTIES COMPLIED WITH REQUIRED ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCEDURES 
Laughy v. Idaho Transportation Department, 149 Idaho 867, 243 P.3d 1055 (2010) 
involved "overlegal" permits that ITD was considering to allow the transportation of so-called 
mega-loads across the U.S. Highway 12 corridor in northern Idaho. Rather than participating in 
the administrative permitting process, the Laughy plaintiffs attempted to bypass that procedure 
and proceed directly to district court. 149 Idaho at 869. The district court acted on the plaintiffs' 
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petition and reversed ITD's decision to issue the permits. Id ITD and the owner of the load, 
ConocoPhillips, appealed the district court decision to this Court. 
On appeal, ITD argued that the district court reached the wrong result. ITD maintained 
that the large loads would not impact the infrastructure of the state highways, and that more than 
adequate measures had been developed to protect the safety and convenience of the general 
public. 
However, this Court found that neither the district court nor the Supreme Court had 
jurisdiction to consider the matter. Id at 876. The Court determined that the permit issued by 
ITD constituted an "order" as that term is defined by the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act 
(IAP A). Id. at 871-72. The permit issued by ITD was the result of an informal disposition of a 
contested case. The Court specifically noted that Idaho Code § 67-5241 (1 )( c ), part of the IAP A, 
"represents a conscious legislative effort to 'encourage informal dispute resolution' related to all 
kinds of agency action. Id. at 872. The Court further determined that the parties to the informal 
procedures "cannot unilaterally decide to utilize informal procedures to the exclusion of formal 
proceedings. 'Unless all parties agree to the contrary in writing, informal proceedings do not 
substitute for formal proceedings and do not exhaust administrative remedies ... "' Id at 872, 
citing ID APA 04.11.01.103. The Court remanded the matter because ITD had not issued a final 
order under the IAP A and therefore jurisdiction for judicial review was not yet appropriate. Id. 
at 874. Subsequently, ITD conducted a hearing under the formal contested case provisions of the 
IAPA. 
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Simply put, the Laughy plaintiffs' avoidance of the required administrative process 
precluded the pursuit of subsequent review. According to the Court, "This rule [requiring 
participation in and exhaustion of the administrative process] prevents anyone from doing what 
Respondents [Laughy] did here: sit out the agency proceedings, show up in court just as a 
decision is made, and force the agency to litigate the matter." Id. at 876. 
The underlying considerations in Laughy are the same as in the present matter. A 
construction claim filed by a contractor, such as Respondent Debco, involves an administrative 
process in which ITD determines the rights of the parties. As this Court noted in Laughy, a two-
step analysis applies in determining whether an agency action constitutes an "order" under the 
IAPA. Id. at 871, citing Westway Constr., Inc. v. Idaho Transp. Dep 't, 139 Idaho 107, 112, 73 
P.3d 721, 726 (2003). 
First to have an order, the Legislature must have empowered the agency to determine the 
particular issue. Here the Legislature has specifically provided the Idaho Transportation Board 
and its Department with the authority "To contract fully, in the name of the state of Idaho, with 
respect to the rights, powers and duties vested in the board by this title." Idaho Code § 40-309. 
One of the duties of the Idaho Transportation Board listed in Title 40 of the Idaho Code is to 
"Locate, design, construct, reconstruct, alter, extend, repair and maintain state highways and 
plan, design and develop statewide transportation systems." Idaho Code § 40-310(4). The 
highway construction contract between ITD and Respondent Debco falls squarely within the 
authority granted to the Board and Department by the Legislature. 
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Additionally, the Legislature provided the Transportation Board with the authority to 
prescribe rules and regulations affecting state highway projects and to enforce those rules. Idaho 
Code § 40-312(1). Accordingly, ITD adopted Standard Specifications for Highway 
Construction, which ITD updates periodically. The Standard Specifications are part of every 
highway construction contract. In regards to the Debco contract, section 105.17 of the 2004 
Standard Specifications states: "The Contractor shall exhaust the Administrative Process for 
resolution, unless the Contractor and the Department agree that claims that have not been 
resolved through the Administrative Process provided in this section, shall be resolved through 
binding arbitration." (R. 000040). In short, ITD has been authorized by the Legislature, and has 
in fact established an administrative process to resolve construction contract disputes. 
Second, Laughy says that an agency action will be deemed an "order" if the agency 
action determines "the legal rights, duties, privileges, immunities, or other legal interests of one 
or more persons." Id. at 871, citing Westway Constr., 139 Idaho at 112, 73 P.3d at 726. As 
discussed above, the administrative process is to determine the rights of the parties under the 
construction contract. 
Respondent Debco initiated the administrative process. However, the next day, without 
waiting for the administrative appeal to proceed ( or even really commence), Debco filed a claim 
with the AAA and initiated binding arbitration. The failure to exhaust administrative remedies in 
this case is analogous to the failure of Mr. Laughy to exhaust his administrative remedies 
relevant to the permit issued by ITD. 
- 12 -
An entity should not be allowed to bypass the administrative process and force the 
Department to move directly into litigation or arbitration. That is what Debco Construction 
attempted to do, and that is why ITD was justified in seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. 
According to Laughy, the AAA arbitration panel would not have jurisdiction unless and until the 
administrative claims process was completed. 
B. THE DISTRICT COURT MISAPPLIED THIS COURT'S RULINGS IN 
STOREY CONSTRUCTION V. HANKS 
Despite the duty to exhaust its available administrative remedies, Respondent Debco 
asserts that this Court's decision in other arbitration cases authorizes a premature filing with the 
AAA. Debco pulled select language from Storey Construction, Inc. v. Hanks, 148 Idaho 401, 
224 P.3d 468 (2009), to suggest that the district court ought to ignore Debee's disregard of the 
contractual claims process. 
Storey Construction presents rather unique circumstances. In Storey Construction, the 
parties had participated in a prior arbitration back in 2003, and the arbitrators had ruled 
substantially in favor of Storey Construction. Then in 2007, the trustee for Hanks initiated 
another round of arbitration, asserting claims that were allegedly unknown back in 2003. Storey 
Construction opposed such via district court on the basis of res judicata. The district court 
concluded that the 2007 claims were barred because of the 2003 arbitration. The Idaho Supreme 
Court reversed. Of note, both the district court and the Supreme Court looked extensively at the 
parties' agreement to arbitrate and sought to decipher whether the parties had submitted the 
specific claims to arbitration. This Court found: 
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"Matters submitted for arbitration are relevant to determining the scope of an 
arbitrator's power and must be considered along with the original agreement to 
arbitrate." Moore v. Omnicare, Inc., 141 Idaho 809, 816, 118 P.3d 141, 148 
(2005) (citations omitted). "Arbitrators are, of course, not free to disregard the 
terms of the contracts they are reviewing-their powers derive from the parties' 
agreement." Mumford v. Miller, 143 Idaho 99, 101, 137 P.3d 1021, 1023 (2006). 
Arbitrators would exceed their powers if they "considered an issue not submitted 
to him by the parties, or exceeded the bounds of the contract between the parties." 
Bingham County Com'n v. Interstate Elec. Co., a Div. of the L.E. Myers Co., 105 
Idaho 36, 42, 665 P.2d 1046, 1052 (1983) .... 
As stated above, the contract required that any claim first be submitted to the 
architect. A claim submitted to the architect was "subject to arbitration" only 
after either a decision by the architect or the expiration of thirty days after it had 
been submitted to the architect. Obviously, unknown claims could not be 
submitted to the architect and, under the parties' agreement, were therefore not 
"subject to arbitration." Consequently, the prior arbitration proceedings could not 
have resolved claims, as defined in the contract, that were unknown or that had 
not been submitted to arbitration. 
148 Idaho at 408-09, 224 P.3d at 475-76 (emphasis added). 
Herein, the Supreme Court acknowledges the limitations placed by the parties on matters 
submitted to arbitration: Such were not "subject to arbitration" unless and until the claims were 
first addressed by the architect. Since the new Hanks' claims were not submitted to the architect 
back in 2003, they could not then have been "submitted to arbitration." Given the previous 
arbitration context, Storey Construction (who had been successful in 2003) was required to go 
back to an arbitration panel for the 2007 claims. 
Respondent Debco pointed to language of the Court issued in determination of a 
subsequent motion (Storey Construction had raised the issue again with the Supreme Court via a 
petition for rehearing). In that context, this Court made it clear that it would not entertain the 
matter further and emphasized that it would defer to the arbitrators in that particular instance: 
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"Arbitrability is a question of law to be decided by the court." Mason v. State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 145 Idaho 197, 200, 177 P.3d 944, 947 (2007). 
However, courts, including this Court, have limited the scope of the question of 
arbitrability. The vast majority have held that issues of procedural arbitrability, 
such as whether conditions precedent to an obligation to arbitrate have been met, 
are for the arbitrators to decide. 
148 Idaho at 412, 224 P.3d at 479. 
The Supreme Court's ruling in the Storey Construction case makes sense given the prior 
arbitration and the potential relation between the 2003 and 2007 claims. Nevertheless, this 
language is offset by the Supreme Court's clear recognition of the courts' role in reviewing the 
parties' contract, and in precluding arbitrators from overreaching by considering matters that 
were not "submitted to arbitration." 
In the present matter, there was no prior arbitration like in Storey Construction. 
Additionally, this is not a dispute between private parties. This is a dispute involving the state of 
Idaho and its ability to resolve the dispute as a contested case under the IAP A. As a result, there 
are claims that cannot now be "subject to litigation" unless and until Debco complied with its 
statutory and contractual obligation to complete the administrative claims process. As explained 
above, this is not merely a contractual "condition precedent" as the term appears to be used in 
Storey Construction. 
ITD is not simply raising a potential or hypothetical issue in this case. After Debco filed 
for arbitration, ITD filed a motion with AAA to stay the arbitration proceedings. ITD received 
notices from AAA in return stating it would nonetheless proceed and form an arbitration panel. 
(R. 000131 ). ITD subsequently received notice from AAA that an initial $1700 was due from 
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ITD as a deposit toward the costs of the arbitration proceedings. (R. 000319 - 000323). Given 
AAA's statements and stance, ITD was relegated to file a declaratory judgment action with the 
district court so as to seek a stay of the arbitration. ITD had not been given a full opportunity to 
receive information from Debco or to review and determine the dispute. 
Ultimately, the arbitration panel addressed the issue, in part, after ITD filed a declaratory 
judgment action. The arbitration panel agreed to delay scheduling the arbitration so as to allow 
ITD additional time to pursue an informal contested case procedure. 
C. AT THE TIME THE DEPARTMENT FILED SUIT, AAA HAD MADE IT 
CLEAR THAT A COURT ORDER WOULD BE REQUIRED TO STAY 
ARBITRATION 
On November 22, 2013, AAA representative Mike Powell sent an e-mail to the parties 
which stated: "Absent mutual agreement or court order, the Association shall proceed with the 
administration of this matter." (R. 000131) ( emphasis added). Debco had previously rebuffed 
all ITD requests for a "mutual agreement" to stay arbitration. ITD, therefore, reasonably 
believed-in accordance with the AAA directive-that a "court order" was invited and necessary 
so as to stay the AAA proceeding. 
ITD's Complaint, filed on December 10, 2013, was in response to AAA's explicit 
statement about pursuing a court order. In the weeks subsequent to ITD's filing suit, the 
arbitration process moved forward quickly, while the district court proceeding progressed more 
slowly. During this time period, ITD consistently asserted that it objected to participation in the 
AAA procedure, but did participate so as to avoid potential waiver. 
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On January 23, 2014, AAA scheduled a preliminary hearing (for February 5, 2014) and 
requested initial payment from the parties (by or before January 31, 2014). In response, ITD 
filed motions on January 27, 2014 for a TRO and preliminary injunction (ITD's efforts continued 
to be in accordance with the AAA statements about court intervention). In its January 28, 2014 
TRO opposition, Debco asserted to the court that it had paid both parties' AAA fees. On January 
30, 2014 the district court concluded that Debco's payment removed pending harm and so the 
court declined to issue a TRO (the preliminary injunction hearing was scheduled for February 
10, 2014). 
The AAA preliminary hearing did occur on February 5, 2014, and the panel declined to 
schedule a full arbitration hearing to consider the actual merits of Debco's claim. This was 
exactly what ITD was seeking-adequate delay in the arbitration process so as to allow 
completion of the contractual claims review process. Granted the requested time by AAA, ITD 
withdrew its February 10th motion for preliminary injunction. 
Debco immediately informed the district court about the AAA's delay in arbitration 
scheduling via a Third Affidavit of Ron T. Blewett. (R. 000433 - 000435). With the recognition 
that ITD had obtained what it was ultimately pursuing, the district court erroneously disregarded 
AAA's statements about a court order, and granted Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal in favor of Debco. 
Unlike the district court, ITD did not have February 2014 hindsight at the time the Department 
filed its Complaint. Of course, had the AAA proceeded as Debco was requesting, ITD would 
have been left in an untenable position (although the district court may have ruled differently if 
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AAA had declined to postpone arbitration scheduling). This Court should reverse the district 
court's erroneous disregard of AAA's "court order" statements. 
D. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING ITO'S COMPLAINT 
PRIOR TO A FULL RULE 56 SUMMARY JUDGMENT HEARING 
In support of its motions for summary judgment and Rule 12(b )( 6) dismissal, Respondent 
Debco submitted a combined supporting brief, numerous affidavits, and other provided items 
that exceeded the provisions of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal. The district court clearly reviewed at 
least some of these items, and in at least one instance the court acknowledged that such was 
taken into consideration. See Third Affidavit of Ron T. Blewett Regarding AAA Scheduling 
Hearing (R. 000433 - 000435) and the district court's references within the Transcript on Appeal 
(Tr. p. 27, L. 5-7 and p. 29, L. 7-11). The district court's statements include: 
I did see with respect to the last affidavit what the current posture is or alleged to 
be of the arbitration itself [i.e., the decision by the AAA panel to postpone any 
scheduling of an ultimate arbitration proceeding]. 
* * * 
And I think that the motions are best in terms of requiring the plaintiff to - pardon 
me, the defendant to comply with the conditions precedent are ones that should be 
brought to the arbitration, and it sounds like they have been [again recognizing 
that the affidavit apprised the district court about the AAA panel's scheduling 
postponement]. 
Tr. p. 27, L. 5-7 and p. 29, L. 7-11. (Emphasis added; bracketed explanations added). 
Notwithstanding the district court's assertion that the affidavits and additional 
information were set aside for purposes of its Rule l 2(b )( 6) consideration, Appellant ITD asserts 
that the lower court's acknowledgment and use of such items demonstrates that dismissal should 
have at least waited until a Rule 56 Summary Judgment hearing. 
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As this Court is aware, Civil Rule 12(b) states: 
If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered ( 6) to dismiss for 
failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not 
excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for 
summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all 
parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material 
made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
I.R.C.P. 12(b) (emphasis added). 
Even if the district court set aside the submitted affidavits (which, as indicated, it did not 
consistently do), such affidavits were explicitly relied on throughout the combined brief. See, for 
example, the "Undisputed Facts" at ,r,r 4, 5, 6 and 7; the "Argument" at part b.; and the 
"Argument" at subpart v. of part c. (R. 000297 - 000302). Further, such information and ideas 
were entwined throughout the remaining arguments and submitted materials. 
In addition, the briefing before the district court contained random statements that, while 
not supported by affidavit, clearly make assertions which are outside the presented pleadings. As 
such, it was difficult to decipher what aspects were intended for the motion to dismiss versus 
what was being delayed until summary judgment. ITD again asserts that it should have been 
given a full opportunity to provide affidavits and other evidence pursuant to a Rule 56 objection. 
Although the district court no doubt made a good faith effort, it seems likely that the abundant 
information derived from outside the pleadings did play a part in the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal 
considerations. 
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E. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING ITO'S COMPLAINT 
VIA CIVIL RULE 12(b)(6) 
Numerous Idaho court decisions emphasize the significant burden required of a defendant 
via a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. For example: 
Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 637, 778 P.2d 757, 759 (1989): The 
nonmoving party is entitled to have all inferences from the record viewed in its 
favor, and only then may the question be asked whether a claim for relief has been 
stated. 
Harper v. Harper, 122 Idaho 535, 536, 835 P.2d 1346, 1347 (Ct. App. 1992): A 
court may grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 
12(b)(6) only "when it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of 
facts in support of [the] claim which would entitle [the plaintiff] to relief." It need 
not appear that the plaintiff can obtain the particular relief prayed for, as long as 
the court can ascertain that some relief may be granted. 
Orthman v. Idaho Power Co., 126 Idaho 960, 962-963, 895 P.2d 561, 563-564 
(1995): We cannot say based upon the general allegations in the complaint, that 
there was no conceivable set of facts which would have entitled Orthman to relief 
... it was error to hold that the pleading was insufficient to allege a duty and 
breach of duty causing injuries. 
Appellant ITD presented both statutory and contractual basis for its requested relief: See 
the Complaint's citations to Idaho Code § 7-902 and § 10-1201 et seq, as well as the specific 
contract provision regarding the administrative claims process (Standard Specification 105.17). 
(R. 000005 - 000010) and (R. 000033 - 000040). Respondent Debco's briefing in support of 
dismissal was replete with inferences that lean to its favor-but those should not have been used 
by the district court as any basis for the motion to dismiss. In accordance with the cited case 
law, Appellant asserts that with even the most minimal of favorable inferences and a cursory 
consideration of conceivable facts, it is clear that ITD made a viable claim for relief. 
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Accordingly, the district court erred in granting the motion to dismiss because Debco failed to 
meet its difficult burden specified by the Civil Rule and Idaho case law. 
F. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRONEOUSLY GRANTED FEES AND COSTS 
TO RESPONDENT DEBCO 
The district court misread applicable precedent and erroneously granted an award of 
attorneys' fees to the Respondent. Appellant ITD respectfully asks that this Court reverse such 
award, and determine that Respondent is owed no attorneys' fees or discretionary costs. 
1. Respondent Is Not Entitled to Fees Under Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) 
Idaho Code § 12-120(3) provides as follows: 
In any civil action to recover on an open account, account stated, 
note, bill, negotiable instrument, guaranty, or contract relating to 
the purchase or sale of goods, wares, merchandise, or services and 
in any commercial transaction unless otherwise provided by law, 
the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee to 
be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs. 
I.C. § 12-120(3) (emphasis added). 
ITD's Complaint, limited to a request for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, 
did not constitute an action to recover on a commercial transaction. Hence, I. C. § 12-120(3) is 
inapplicable and provides no basis for awarding attorney's fees. 
In considering I. C. § 12-120(3 ), Idaho courts have recognized that the provision does not 
provide a basis to award fees in cases where there is no effort to pursue recovery via a 
commercial transaction: 
Black Diamond Alliance, LLC v. Kimball, 148 Idaho 798, 801-802, 229 P.3d 
1160, 1163-1164 (2010) ( one party sought to recover fees because of "the nature 
of the underlying commercial transaction"; however, "This Court declines to 
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award attorney fees under Idaho Code section 12-120(3) because this was not an 
action to recover on a commercial transaction."). 
PHH Mortgage Services Corp, v. Perreira, 146 Idaho 631, 641, 200 P.3d 1180, 
1190 (2009) ("This case was brought by PHH to eject the Perreiras and Anestos 
from their residence, and the Perreiras counterclaim sought to contest the 
foreclosure sale of their residence. This was not an action to recover in a 
commercial transaction."). 
Brower v. El. DuPont De Nemours and Company, 117 Idaho 780, 784, 792 P.2d 
345, 349 (1990) ("These cases [five cases cited and previously discussed in 
Brower,'] lead to the conclusion that the award of attorney's fees is not warranted 
every time a commercial transaction is remotely connected with the case. Rather, 
the test is whether the commercial transaction comprises the gravamen of the 
lawsuit. Attorney's fees are not appropriate under I.C. § 12-120(3) unless the 
commercial transaction is integral to the claim, and constitutes the basis upon 
which the party is attempting to recover. To hold otherwise would be to convert 
the award of attorney's fees from an exceptional remedy justified only by 
statutory authority to a matter ofright in virtually every lawsuit filed."). 
Bracketed explanation and underlined emphasis added. 
As in the cited cases, ITD's action for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief did not 
constitute an action to recover in a commercial transaction. This is in accord with Respondent's 
initial memorandum of costs, which acknowledged: "The gravamen of plaintiffs complaint was 
to stay arbitration under the Uniform Arbitration Act .... " See Memorandum at page 2. (R. 
000473). As such, this contrasts with the requirements and intent of LC. § 12-120(3), which 
applies only when a complaint seeks recovery via a commercial dispute. 
The district court's application of I.C. § 12-120(3) would modify "an exceptional remedy 
justified only by statutory authority to a matter of right in virtually every lawsuit filed." See 
Brower, 117 Idaho at 784, 792 P.2d at 349. 
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2. Respondent is Not Entitled to Fees under Idaho Code§ 12-117 
Respondent is not entitled to attorney fees or discretionary costs under Idaho Code § 12-
117. This statute states in part: 
(1) Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any proceeding involving as adverse 
parties a state agency or a political subdivision and a person, the state agency, 
political subdivision or the court hearing the proceeding, including on appeal, 
shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and other 
reasonable expenses, if it finds that the nonprevailing party acted without a 
reasonable basis in fact or law. 
Idaho Code § 12-117 (underlined emphasis added). 
This Court has frequently determined that a state agency, even if it is judged to be 
mistaken in its course of action, was not acting without a reasonable basis in fact or law so as to 
give rise to an award of costs or fees. For example: 
Treasure Valley Concrete, Inc. v. State, 132 Idaho 673, 678, 978 P.2d 233, 238 
(1999) (although the State lost a quiet title action, "we cannot conclude that the 
State acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law in defending this action."). 
Henderson v. Eclipse Traffic Control and Flagging, Inc., 147 Idaho 628, 635, 213 
P.3d 718, 725 (2009) ("Henderson is not entitled to fees under this statute [I.C. § 
12-117]. Although Henderson is the prevailing party, she is not entitled to fees 
because she has failed to show that the Department [ of Commerce and Labor] 
acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law."). 
State, Department of Finance v. Resource Service Co., Inc., 134 Idaho 282, 285, 1 
P.3d 783, 786 (2000) (despite a previous ruling by the Idaho Supreme Court 
requiring that the Department of Finance's complaint be dismissed, fees were not 
awarded because "the Department was not without a reasonable basis in fact or 
law in bringing and maintaining suit against RSC for violation of the Idaho 
Securities Act."). 
McCoy v. State, Department of Health and Welfare, 127 Idaho 792, 797, 907 P.2d 
110, 115( 1995) ("Although the Department's justification for denying coverage 
was in error for the reasons stated in this opinion, its defense of this position was 
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certainly not so unreasonable as to justify the imposition of attorney fees under 
IC.§ 12-117."). 
In the present matter, ITD acted with good faith and reasonableness comparable to that 




The district court misread and misapplied this Court's prior cases dealing with arbitration 
and the respective roles of courts and arbitrators. In doing so, the district court precluded the 
Transportation Department from enforcing its administrative claims process. In addition, the 
district court acted contrary to the instructions of this Court regarding the use of and deference to 
informal procedures to resolve a contested matter. The declaratory and injunctive relief sought 
by ITD was necessary and just, and the Department at all times acted reasonably in its efforts to 
sustain its contract and claims procedures. ITD respectfully asks that this Court reverse the 
district court's grant of Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, as well as the award of attorneys' fees and 
discretionary costs. 
DATED this 15th day of August, 2014. 
G~~ 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
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